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Revisiting intersectionality  
for EU anti-discrimination law in an economic crisis –  
A critical legal studies perspective 
 









“One-dimensional equality is not enough” – this slogan captures a criti-
cal perspective on EU anti-discrimination law and policy, which challenges 
the neglect of intersectional inequalities. But how many dimensions does a 
critical legal discourse on anti-discrimination law need? Asking the ques-
tion suggests that the intersectionality critique of equality policy takes a 
specific turn if based on a critical legal perspective. The article suggests 
that discrimination law (as a sub-section of the anti-discrimination dis-
course) should remain focused on discrimination events around the nodes 
gender/sex, ethnicity/‘race’, and disability/impairment – leaving the catego-
ry of class to sociological discourse on intersectionality and to social and 
labour law, as a category to be distinguished from anti-discrimination law.  
This distinction is particularly useful in times when the ongoing global 
economic crisis has led to a reinvigorated interest in social inequalities 
along class lines. In such times, the capacity to critique anti-crisis measures 
from the perspective of anti-discrimination law as an independent category 
is invaluable, as well as the willingness to expand this critique to new con-
 
* Queen’s University Belfast. This article owes much to discussion with peers, in particular 
at the Equality is Not Enough conference in Antwerp (February 2015), convened by Alison 
Woodward, Daniël Cuypers, and Petra Meier; a day conference on Intersectionality in late 
2013 in Brussels, convened by the same trio, where it was linked to a paper by Myra Marx 
Feree; and to discussions during the NCRE & UC workshop on 1 April 2016 in Christ-
church (New Zealand) on invitation by Annick Masselot; and specific comments by Ulrike 
M. Vieten. A critical review of “European Union Non-Discrimination Law and Intersection-
ality: Investigating the Triangle of Racial, Gender and Disability Discrimination” (Baer 
2012) spurred the idea of this article, and anonymous referees’ feedback contributed to the 
quality. The usual disclaimer applies. 
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cepts of social policy developed in order to defy anti-crisis measures. The 
article develops this specific approach to intersectionality and EU anti-
discrimination law from a critical legal scholar’s perspective, which aims to 
maintain momentum by linking its argument to social movements. 
The argument proceeds as follows: first, we sketch the specific perspec-
tive on critical legal studies. Based on the close interrelation of EU anti-
discrimination law with social movements that shape this socio-legal field, 
we portray the contribution of social movements to EU anti-discrimination 
law and the resulting compartmentalisation, which at the same time limits 
the use of intersectionality in its application. Next, the article shortly sum-
marises the proposal of a conceptual reconfiguration of existing EU anti-
discrimination legislation. That reconfiguration is based on revealing the 
purpose of anti-discrimination law as its normative base, referring to Iris 
Marion Young’s and Nancy Fraser’s work. It re-interprets its existing pro-
visions so as to refocus the field around the nodes sex/gender, 
‘race’/ethnicity, and impairment/disability.  
This concept contradicts the current trend in discussing intersectionality, 
which follows the wider tendency to align policies combating poverty and 
generally improving working and living conditions of citizens on the one 
hand, and anti-discrimination policies on the other, and suggests a further 
expansion of discrimination grounds by the addition of ‘class’.  
Would the addition of ‘class’ as a discrimination ground under EU anti-
discrimination law constitute a superior model for addressing intersectional 
inequalities than the proposed refocusing on the three nodes sex/gender, 
‘race’/ethnicity, and impairment/disability? In order to provide an experi-
mental answer to this question, we analyse discrimination law discourses 
challenging austerity measures, establishing how far they respond to inter-
sectional inequalities. We find that some intersectional inequalities, e.g. the 
situation of ethnic minority women, are once again neglected. The experi-
ment thus demonstrates that a tightly focused anti-discrimination law ex-
poses specific injustices, which are once again neglected as soon as the fo-
cus is lost. 
The article concludes that EU anti-discrimination legislation, which is 
essentially focused on market inclusion, should refrain from using class as 
a “forbidden ground” in the same way as sex, race and disability. In this 
way EU anti-discrimination law will best serve as a standard for legislation 
and other action emanating from the public sphere which enhances inter-
sectional inequalities.  
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2. A critical legal scholar’s perspective  
Since critical legal studies is a field too wide to condense into one ap-
proach, the specific starting point to this methodological approach should 
be clarified. In my view, critical legal scholarship, if aligned with a left po-
litical project, should exploit the Janus-faced character of any legal order, 
which can be found in the space between lex and ius. Most European lan-
guages use different expressions for law mirroring these two Latin words. 
Lex stands for the positive law consisting of legislation and case law and 
overall the accepted doctrine. Lex tends to mirror the established consensus 
and as such support the societal status quo. Ius is frequently translated as 
justice. It holds out the promise that law may generate justice for all parts 
of the population. Obviously there can be a tension between lex and ius. 
Any critical interpretation of law works with this tension and challenges the 
established consensus by reference to justice, and thus creates space for 
changes in the law overall1. This approach maintains an original contribu-
tion of legal scholarship to critical studies, in contrast with approaches 
which only perceive law as a variable on the fringes of social policy debate, 
relegated to the role of a handmaiden for political science or sociological 
analysis. 
Maintaining that legal scholarship can make an original contribution to 
critical studies should not be taken as a justification to neglect sociology in 
critical legal scholarship. After all, legal theory – even if exceedingly 
critical – without a reference point in practice will create little, if any 
momentum. In particular, critical legal scholarship should be aligned to 
social movements. Accordingly, the next section briefly discusses the 
contribution of social movements to EU anti-discrimination law and poli-
cy, and in particular to the capacity of EU anti-discrimination law to ad-
dress intersectionality.  
3. Social movements, legislation and the use of intersectionality in EU anti-
discrimination law 
Social movements and their use of the law were decisive for EU anti-
discrimination law to develop. We all know that EU anti-discrimination 
law started with gender equality – the equal pay principle was part of the 
Treaty of Rome (cf. today’s Article 157 TFEU), alongside the prohibition 
of nationality discrimination (today’s Article 18 TFEU). Both were based 
 
1 For more references on this, see Schiek 2010a: 70-71, and Schiek 2012: 159-160. 
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on the familiar mix of economic and social motives: discrimination was 
banned in order to prevent Member States and economic actors from enjoy-
ing competitive advantages by undercutting standards. Nowadays the equal 
pay clause is perceived as a starting point of the EU’s wider body of sex 
equality law. That body was not only developed by the legislator. Its career 
started when female trade unionists and legal activists, disappointed with 
the progress towards implementing for the principle of equal pay for wom-
en and men, started to litigate before the Court of Justice and before nation-
al courts in order to convert into a practical tool what then was article 119 
EEC (Hoskyns 1996: 64-70). The EU legislator followed suit and outlawed 
sex discrimination in employment2, complementing this body of directives 
by a guarantee of sex equality in the provision of goods and services3. The 
latter change attempted to close the gap between protection against sex dis-
crimination and race discrimination in secondary EU law emerging in 
20004. 
From 1999, when Eastern enlargement loomed large, and a right wing 
populist party became a government partner in Austria, the EU started leg-
islating against racism5. As suggested by the Starting Line Group, which 
emerged from national movements focusing on racism as well as migration, 
the EU legislator shortly thereafter expanded its anti-discrimination law to 
disability, religion and belief, age, and sexual orientation (Schiek 2009b: 4-
5), integrating concerns of disability rights’ movements6, and promoters of 
gay equality7. Development of EU anti-discrimination policy, a term used 
by the EU Commission to encompass policies around Directives 2000/43 
 
2 These are very numerous, but the main directives are Directive 2006/54 [OJ2006 
L204/23] (initially Directives 76/207 and 75/117), and Directive 79/7[OJ1979 L6/24].  
3 Directive 2004/113/EC [OJ 2004 L373/37], see on this the ECJ ruling in C-236/09 
(Test Achats) [2001] ECR I-773. 
4 Interestingly, the academic debate included voices chastising any critique of a lower 
level of protection for women against sex discrimination as “envious feminists” (Guiraudon 
2009). While those stressing that “women are neither a minority nor a group” (e.g., 
Koukoulis-Spiliotopoulos 2005, reiterating the Women’s Lobby’s Slogan) were a minority 
in themselves, most academic authors criticised the hierarchies of equality. See, for exam-
ple, Holzleithner 2005. 
5 Directive 2000/43/EC [OJ 2000 L180/22]; on its history see Niessen 2004. 
6 This term best captures the focus of the national and European level activist groupings 
engaging for the inclusion of disabled persons into society (Kemple et al. 2011), though its 
EU level emanation uses the name “European Disability Forum” (Mabbet 2005). 
7 Interestingly, the latter group remained hidden to a large extent in the negotiation pro-
cedures, with some authors indicating that this was related to some protagonists of wider 
equality agendas not being open about their homosexuality (Bell 2002: 35-42). 
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and 2000/78 exclusively8, was henceforth supported by, and linked to, an 
EU level expert lobby, which was partly rooted in national and transnation-
al movements (Verloo 2013).  
It is important to note that this specific body of EU anti-discrimination 
legislation is aimed at combating discrimination in the market sphere. 
While much of the initial case law on sex discrimination (in contrast to case 
law on nationality-based discrimination) concerned Member States as em-
ployers, the states were addressed as gate-keepers for market access. Even 
where discrimination in social security issues, or access to funded transport, 
was at stake, these claims were ancillary to enabling employment market 
participation. The resulting critique of EU discrimination law as market-
annexed (Somek 2011) misses its mark: in societies where inclusion is 
governed by markets, discrimination law has to address market discrimina-
tion effectively, lest it become irrelevant in social reality.  
Up to this stage, social movements focusing on sex equality, disability 
rights, and the combat of racism and xenophobia specifically initiated and 
drove forward EU anti-discrimination law and policy. In line with the com-
partmentalisation of those movements, EU anti-discrimination policy pro-
ceeded along compartmentalised axes. The field was thus criticised as ne-
glecting intersectional inequalities which are typical for many women’s 
lives (Schiek & Chege 2009; Schiek & Lawson 2011).  
While the EU Treaties and ensuing legislation had, from 1957, focused 
on nationality discrimination and sex discrimination, from 2000 EU legisla-
tion demanded that Member States outlaw employment discrimination on 
six grounds: sex, ethnic and racial origin, religion and belief, age, sexual 
orientation, and disability. Discrimination on grounds of racial and ethnic 
origin as well as on grounds of sex has to be outlawed beyond employment 
to varying degrees, among others, using anti-discrimination bodies as sup-
porting enforcement. From 2000, the multiplicity of discrimination 
grounds9 invited the development of intersectionality (or multidimensional-
ity) as an element of EU anti-discrimination policy10. The intersection be-
 
8 For a recount of downgrading of gender equality to a secondary policy issue see Schiek 
2010b. 
9 This term is used as a convenient abbreviation of “characteristics specified in positive 
discrimination law as those on grounds of which discrimination is forbidden”. See, for ex-
ample, Schiek et al. 2007: 4. 
10 The EU Commission embraced the opportunity to highlight the relative modernity of 
the EU’s equality policy by funding some policy studies on this, with the highest funding 
awarded to Zarrehparvar & Osander (2007). Their study did not systematically cover sex 
discrimination (Schiek 2009a). As a result, a new report on intersectionality by the now 
merged expert network on non-gender and gender equality is being produced under the au-
thorship of Sandra Fredman (2016).  
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tween discrimination on grounds of racial and ethnic origin on the one 
hand, and sex on the other, was to be addressed with priority, while in em-
ployment, multiple intersectional inequalities were to be addressed as well.  
Nevertheless, EU- and national-level expert lobbies and movements re-
mained curiously separate. To the present day, the European Women’s 
Lobby and other gender-focused expert groups coexist with the European 
Network Against Racism and a number of other activist groups combating 
racist discrimination. The European Disability Rights movement, strength-
ened by the adoption of the UN Convention on the Rights of People with 
Disabilities, also maintains separate organisational structures. Since a legal 
field, such as discrimination law, is constructed not only by the law in the 
books, but also by actors using the law in social reality, this state of affairs 
can constitute a hindrance for EU anti-discrimination law to fully embrace 
intersectionality. It seems initially plausible, that one-point movements 
would maintain their initial focus, and continue to lobby for compart-
mentalised equalities. Gender activists, such as the European Women’s 
Lobby, can be assumed to have a “gender first” attitude, while also support-
ing intersectionality strategies. After all, as the EU Directives also stress, 
women are most frequently affected by discrimination on more than one 
ground11. Thus, for gender equality experts, the intersectionality discourse 
constitutes an opportunity to widen the scope of policies supporting their 
cause (Verloo 2013: 909-910). As gender equality lobbying groups have a 
sound base in many EU Member States12, intersectionality claims can be 
expected to flourish. Any legal action group addressing sex discrimination 
could derive a legal base for claims from relying on intersectional discrimi-
nation, if representing women in areas such as access to education or 
healthcare, for which EU legislation allows sex discrimination to prevail at 
national levels.  
Organisations roughly grouped under the umbrella of a European anti-
racism movement have demonstrated a commitment to multiple forms of 
discrimination by lobbying for Directive 2000/78, and more recently for a 
directive outlawing non-employment discrimination for the discrimination 
grounds covered by that directive13. They might also have an interest in 
stressing intersectionality, including of sex and racial and ethnic origin, 
 
11 Cf. Recital 14 and Article 17 of Directive 2000/43, and Recital 8 and Article 19 of Di-
rective 2000/78 [OJ 2000 L303/16]. By contrast, not even the youngest Gender Directives 
refer to intersectional disadvantage (Schiek 2010b). 
12 For a critical assessment of the strength of any gender social movement in post social-
ist Member States see Havelková & Oates-Indruchová 2014. 
13 COM (2008) 426 final (Schiek & Mulder 2011), which the Commission plans to 
retable. 
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since this would allow them to demonstrate that the privileged position of 
the latter discrimination in EU secondary law does not harm women’s in-
terests14. However, those lobbying for a better response by the EU to racist 
discrimination might also feel that the EU still privileges sex discrimination 
in its primary law, e.g. through the specific clause on promoting sex equali-
ty in Article 23 Charter of Fundamental Rights for the European Union, 
and the gender mainstreaming clause in Article 8 TFEU, which is stronger 
than the obligation to combat discrimination on grounds of race and others 
(Article 10 TFEU)15. Also, anti-racism in the EU has a less prevalent na-
tional base than gender equality, which might feed a motivation to profile 
the cause of combating racism specifically. 
The EU Disability Rights movement can be assumed to support intersec-
tionality. After all, the UN CPRD is one of the first conventions to promote 
an intersectional approach. Further, politics for disabled people have a 
strong national base, as well as enjoying wider social acceptance than, for 
example, anti-racism politics, due to the potential of anyone to become dis-
abled. Thus, we could assume that those organisations also are open to 
combating intersectional inequalities. 
While this article cannot replace the lack of social movement research, 
which would enable us to present a full picture of the state of affairs, an 
evaluation of existing research renders some interesting observations. For 
example, data gathered by the EU funded EUROSPHERE project through 
document analysis and expert interviews in 16 countries has been interpret-
ed as showing a limited commitment to intersectionality by “anti-racist and 
gender equality activists in Europe” (Pristed Nielsen 2012). The identifica-
tion of intersectional inequalities as an important field of activity relies on 
utterances in documents both on paper and on web pages, and in inter-
views. Thus, the project did not investigate any advocacy or other activity 
on the ground. Nevertheless, Pristed Nielsen’s data is very interesting in 
that she finds women’s organisations systematically stressing the relevance 
of race and ethnicity, while anti-racist campaigners also mention gender at 
times. She also finds a discrepancy between EU and national level organi-
sations: the latter display less awareness for intersectionality.  
A more recent analysis of litigation strategies around Roma equality and 
gender equality (Jacquot & Vitale 2015), on the other hand, confirms the 
observation that the separated structure of the lobby groups by-and-large 
results in compartmentalised anti-discrimination analysis. The European 
Women’s Lobby is portrayed as following the development of the EU gen-
 
14 For a critical perspective on this see Oprea 2009. 
15 For a wider critique see Hepple 2004.  
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der policy and law, while stressing that women are not a minority, and fo-
cusing on gender mainstreaming as opposed to equality mainstreaming. 
The European Roma and Travellers’ Forum, on the other hand, is reported 
as using intersectionality approaches in promoting the interests of Europe’s 
Roma communities.  
The European Disability Movement could be seen as most open to inter-
sectionality in practice: even after the adoption of the UNCRPWD, the rel-
evant organisations did not lobby for a separate directive – modelled on Di-
rective 2004/113 for example – which would oblige Member States to out-
law disability discrimination beyond employment and, via the accepted le-
gal construction of reasonable accommodation, would create a stronger le-
gal base for accessibility politics. Instead, it remained part of the wider 
non-discrimination, lobbying for a Directive demanding the same policy on 
grounds of age, religion and belief, disability, and sexual orientation, which 
has not yet been enacted.  
Overall, while EU anti-discrimination policy is still compartmentalised, 
at the EU-level, some national, lobbying groups support politics addressing 
intersectional inequalities. Accordingly, there is a base for expanding legal 
protections against intersectional inequalities.  
EU legislation banning discrimination in the market place clearly can be 
interpreted in this direction (Schiek 2005). The recitals of the directives 
mention multiple-discrimination, and two of them even contain an obliga-
tion to report on the phenomenon. While case law in some common law ju-
risdictions has hesitated to acknowledge intersectional discrimination as le-
gally wrong16, a teleological interpretation of EU secondary law, in line 
with the “dynamic interpretation” the Court of Justice typically uses in oth-
er fields, would suggest a coherent interpretation of the Directives to in-
clude a ban on intersectional discrimination (Schiek 2005). Accordingly, 
national courts on the European Continent and in Scandinavia have accept-
ed intersectional discrimination more readily than Irish and British courts17. 
Nevertheless, the Court has as yet hesitated to employ its dynamic interpre-
tation to this end, and advocates have not promoted intersectional discrimi-
nation in litigation strategies (Bullock & Masselot 2012; Onufri 2014; 
Schiek 2009a; Schiek & Mulder 2011). At the time of writing, the first ref-
erence explicitly addressing intersectionality (between male homosexuality 
and age) is pending before the Court of Justice (Case C-445/15 Parry v 
Trinity College Dublin). 
 
16 See on this the coverage for UK law in Schiek & Lawson 2011; Grabham et al. 2011; 
see also McColgan 2014: 54-59 and Monaghan 2011. 
17 Schiek 2009b. For national approaches see the national reports in this volume (coordi-
nated by Susanne Burri and Hanneke van Eijken) and Skjeje 2009; Roseberry 2009. 
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4. Intersectionality and EU anti-discrimination legislation 
Feminist legal scholars have criticised anti-discrimination law for its 
lack of responsiveness to multiple inequalities involving gender/sex 
through intersectionality theory18. As the analysis of the wording of EU an-
ti-discrimination legislation confirms, it is necessary for the achievement of 
its aims that intersectional discrimination is addressed. This is even more 
relevant in the fields addressed by EU legislation demanding that discrimi-
nation in market places is outlawed. Discrimination in market places results 
in exclusion from opportunities to participate in societal exchange. If these 
exclusions are based on intersections of, for example, ethnicity and gender, 
or disability and race, their socio-economic effect is bound to be more det-
rimental than instances of individual discrimination19. Thus, if intersection-
al discrimination is not acknowledged, the impact of EU anti-
discrimination law is seriously diminished. At the same time, the sociologi-
cal discourse on intersectionality appears to require a degree of differentia-
tion that may deter the most determined anti-discrimination lawyer. The 
multiplication of categories accepted as relevant for intersectionality analy-
sis, and their infinite combination, seems to establish an ever more diversi-
fied analytical field.  
Law is increasingly seen as inadequate to cut through this thicket20. The 
unlimited multiplication of intersectional identities in sociological intersec-
tionality discourses is not suitable for a critical legal project. This does not, 
however, mean that legal discourse, litigation, and court rulings have to dis-
regard inequalities at the intersections of discrimination grounds that matter 
for their purposes.  
Accordingly, the case has been made for refocusing the socio-legal field 
of market-centred EU anti-discrimination law, while expanding the number 
of discrimination grounds (Schiek 2011, 2016). Discrimination grounds 
such as sexual orientation, inability to bear children due to not having a 
womb while being categorised as female21, or becoming pregnant, can all 
be re-focused as gender discrimination, while discrimination on grounds of 
 
18 Intersectionality has been rephrased recently as a research programme spanning sever-
al disciplines (Cho et al. 2013), united by the mission to ensure recognition of specific dis-
advantage ensuing from intersections of different treatment, for example on grounds of sex 
and race, race and disability, or disability and sex. 
19 On the difference between cumulative and truly intersectional discrimination see 
Makkonen 2002 and Schiek 2009b. 
20 Accordingly, some fail to see any advantage of applying intersectionality to anti-
discrimination law, e.g., Conaghan 2009. 
21 On the associated critique of the ECJ’s judgment in Z. v A Government Department, 
C-363/12 ECLI:EU:C:2014:159, see Schiek 2016: 60 with references. 
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having a minority religion, an accent perceived as strange, or exhibiting 
colourings or clothing costumes being categorised as other, will be associ-
ated with ethnicity and race, and discrimination on grounds of being too 
slow in moving (whether on grounds of age, illness, or pregnancy), being 
not able to walk, or needing specific care, will be categorised as belonging 
to the disability node. This re-categorisation of discrimination grounds 
around nodes counteracts the arbitrariness of limitless proliferation of dis-
crimination grounds. Such misguided proliferation could be accelerated by 
demanding to acknowledge intersections between any of the 21 EU dis-
crimination grounds as specific groups protected by discrimination law. 
This would reduce the clarity and focus of EU anti-discrimination law to an 
extent that it would become impractical. Refocusing of EU anti-
discrimination law could be supported in a merely positivistic way by 
pointing to the three UN anti-discrimination conventions, which focus on 
discrimination against women, racist discrimination, and discrimination 
(and other rights) of people with disabilities22.  
However, this is not a very convincing justification. In developing de-
fences against European social state retrenchment from the perspective of 
anti-discrimination law, it would appear necessary to develop a more so-
phisticated justification for omitting class from the relevant nodes for dis-
crimination law (Baer 2012). After all, the discourse on intersectionality, 
after crossing the Atlantic as well as disciplines, debates gender, race, and 
class as the central categories for intersecting inequalities. Accordingly, the 
nodes concept promotes a differentiation between this sociological dis-
course and the legal instruments of anti-discrimination law. In order to jus-
tify that differentiation, it is necessary to turn to the normative base of anti-
discrimination law, in particular of market-directed anti-discrimination law.  
The normative basis of this aspect of anti-discrimination law, which is 
aimed at combating societal exclusion beyond political and public arenas, 
has been summarised as overcoming disadvantages related to ascribed oth-
erness (Schiek 2000, 2002). Ascribed otherness works to categorise persons 
as heteronomous as opposed to autonomous. Ascribing otherness, or other-
ing, in my view, is the specific mark of creating social disadvantage 
through market based discrimination. It is distinct from social inequalities 
associated with the class divide and poverty. 
The ban on states differentiating between their citizens, which is part of 
most Western constitutions, and also reiterated in the European Convention 
on Human Rights (Article 14 and associated protocol), as well as in the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights for the European Union (Article 21), has 
 
22 See already Schiek 2002 and Schiek 2011. 
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aspirations different from and beyond combating market based discrimina-
tion. It aims to ensure equality of citizens in the political process. Ever 
since nation states have been defined as including those who need to en-
gage in dependent work to sustain themselves, constitutional discrimination 
clauses have banned discrimination on grounds of descent, property, and 
other emanations of class. The theme of political intersectionality, which 
has been explored by political scientists, is linked to this kind of equality in 
the political process (Krzsán et al. 2012; Verloo 2013). The ban on states’ 
discrimination against their citizens is not the subject of this article, and al-
so not of EU anti-discrimination legislation. Instead EU anti-discrimination 
legislation targets discrimination in market places. Thus, the question to be 
answered is: what exactly is the normative basis of the ban on discrimina-
tion in market places, which are constituted as different from the political 
agora.  
Discrimination lawyers from the US and the UK, if arguing on the basis 
of doctrinal discourse, tend to answer this question uniformly for market-
focused and politically-focused discrimination law. Such intermingled ex-
planations have difficulty distinguishing between ascribed otherness and 
class-based discrimination. For example, in 1996, Koppelman distilled as 
the basis of anti-discrimination law an obligation on the state to refrain 
from supporting the social construction of stigmatised classes (Koppelman 
1996: 92ff.). While the aspiration of his book is only to legitimise anti-
discrimination laws aimed at racism and sexism, including homophobic ex-
clusion, he never denies that the class conflict – in the US American setting 
– underlies and informs race inequality23. Against this background, race 
discrimination laws may take the place of social welfare laws, and vice ver-
sa. The insistence on an anti-discrimination discourse has been explained 
by the US American aversion against social state paradigms in the context 
of analysing disability discrimination law (Quinn & Flynn 2012). As a 
more recent recount states, the harm combated by discrimination law con-
sists of categorising persons by way of stereotypes and stigma (Khaitan 
2015). Again, this discourse relates to positive anti-discrimination law, but 
the same reasoning could be expanded to class discrimination.  
In identifying the purpose of market focused anti-discrimination law, we 
must look beyond the state however. As mentioned, EU anti-discrimination 
legislation does this by focusing at horizontal relationships. What is the 
purpose of going beyond state-citizen relations in anti-discrimination law 
then?  
 
23 See, for example, Koppelman 1996: 97-100 with reference to Myrdal. 
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The theoretical frame frequently adopted is the one developed by Iris 
Marion Young (2009)24. Young identified as the main purpose of anti-
discrimination law the need to address positional difference in societies. 
These derive from interactions based on categorical distinctions in hierar-
chies of status and privilege, thus producing durable inequalities. In 
Young’s view, these inequalities are characterised by divisions of labour, as 
well as normalisation. Young’s academic position changed during her life-
time (Martínez-Bascuñán 2012: 136-158): while she stressed the equal rank 
of distributive justice and the politics of difference in her earlier work, her 
later work – for example mirrored in her posthumous publication of 2009 – 
focuses on structural inequalities as more relevant for social ordering and 
social justice. Young has thus moved more and more towards a Marxist 
conception of social justice, furthering this thinking by adding recognition 
for the gendered division of labour as a fundamental social structure. Her 
conceptualisation of normalisation which serves to suppress the recognition 
of bodily difference also offers a starting point to convey disability as a 
structural inequality. The politics of difference captures the specific dimen-
sion of racialising class in US society as a category different from social 
group formation along the class divide. While, for Young, social class cer-
tainly is among those social divisions whose recognition is a precondition 
of achieving social justice, her work also allows for conceptualisation of 
the relevance of central categories for anti-discrimination law. It is thus an 
excellent starting point for establishing the normative purpose of anti-
discrimination law. It allows us to recognise that establishing groups along 
the categorical differences based on division of labour, normalisation, and 
construction of bodily and cultural difference, is of immense relevance for 
distributive decisions – even though distribution is not the only dynamic by 
which social justice is defined.  
Taking into account Nancy Fraser’s critique of Young’s work enables us 
to move closer to the normative goal of market-focused anti-discrimination 
law in particular. Fraser (2000; 2007) offers a differentiation between the 
“new social movements”, promoting feminism and anti-racism, and the 
class divide in the world after socialism. While the class divide was the 
promoter of policies aiming to equalise social injustice by redistribution, 
racism, sexism, and (implicitly) ableism, demand other answers, which in 
Fraser’s view are based on recognition. However, instead of proclaiming 
redistribution and recognition as incommensurable, the redistributive char-
acter of anti-discrimination policy is recognised. The difference between 
 
24 For a variety of reflections on Iris Marion Young from European perspectives see 
Vieten 2014. 
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the socialist social policy, and social policy after socialism, consists of the 
fact that the post-socialist policy fields defined by feminist and antiracist 
movements, for example, generate policies recognising difference instead 
of equalising social divides such as the class divide, or between the rich and 
the poor (Martínez-Bascuñán 2012: 159-167).  
Using an alternative distinction, one could characterise those categories 
addressed by anti-discrimination law as different from fundamental cleav-
ages dividing societies as a consequence of fundamental change25. Exam-
ples for such cleavages include that between religion and secularity (after 
Europe’s secularisation), rural areas and cities, as well as class divides after 
industrialisation. Cultural difference, while leading to stable inequalities 
based on ascribing difference, are of a different quality altogether.  
Anti-discrimination law addresses the ill of exclusion in the market 
place based on a specific kind of de-recognition. These are de-recognitions 
that are not linked to any rationality, and appear as archaic if used as a base 
for differentiation. At the same time, these de-recognitions constitute ele-
ments of persons’ identities outside the categories of the market (such as 
consumer identity, class identity, or poverty) which they are not expected to 
suppress or neglect. Banning such cultural exclusion in the market place as 
the main distributive mechanism of Western societies, discrimination law 
has distributional consequences. However, it will not require assimilation, 
since the differences are seen as expressions of human diversity to be re-
spected and cherished. These are the conceptual reasons for not using class 
as a discrimination ground in European anti-discrimination law, which im-
pact on the concept of intersectionality in law26. 
When those theorising European anti-discrimination law regimes define 
as its purpose the overcoming of structural disadvantage (Fredman 2011: 
28-38; McColgan 2014: 36-37), this might suggest aligning anti-
discrimination law and policy with the overarching aims of social policy in 
general. Thus, anti-discrimination law and policy have been criticized be-
cause this field of law does not achieve the same kind of social justice as 
classical European policies aimed at de-commodification (Somek 2011). 
This critique is not convincing in the light of the normative dimensions de-
veloped above. It is not the goal of anti-discrimination law to promote the 
same dimension of social justice as social law and policy addressing dis-
tributive and participatory injustices of capitalism. Instead, anti-
discrimination law addresses exclusions of a different kind, and must com-
plement, but not replace, social and welfarist policies.  
 
25 Gerhards & Lengfeld 2015: 45-47, with reference to Stein Rokkan. 
26 See for a similar differentiation Verloo 2006. 
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These deliberations justify focusing EU anti-discrimination law, espe-
cially its market based branch, on nodes around gender, race, and disability. 
The nodes model provides a normative frame for acknowledging discrimi-
nation ills. It also provides a structure which pictures overlap between those 
nodes as the normal state of affairs. This suggests that discrimination on 
grounds of such overlap, or intersections, is accepted as discrimination to 
be challenged by law.  
5. Current uses of intersectionality: class, poverty, and general socio-
economic disadvantage as discrimination grounds? 
This refocus is not aligned with all recent uses of intersectionality. As 
stressed initially, the journey of intersectionality as an analytical category 
from its origins in legal scholarship and advocacy, to sociological and polit-
ical science analysis, implies the heightened relevance of class. In parallel, 
the use of anti-discrimination law in international human rights discourse, 
as well as in international labour law, has changed to include a new focus 
on poverty and general socio-economic disadvantage. The “transformation” 
of human rights has been developed as a research agenda aligning general 
human rights discourses with those developed in anti-discrimination law 
(Fredman 2008). In analysing the practical policies of the ILO, the “inclu-
sive equality framework” is praised for its potential to converge agendas 
pursued by labour law and anti-discrimination law respectively (Sheppard 
2015: 257-260). The increased relevance of socio-economic inequalities in 
the European Union and elsewhere is underlined by public reactions to the 
global economic crisis. International financial institutions, partly in collab-
oration with European institutions, demand that states reduce institutions 
established to guarantee social inclusion. The resultant change is felt most 
acutely in Continental Europe, where promoting social equality at large has 
been an acknowledged task of the state for a long time27. 
Against this background, it is not surprising that intersectionality is de-
veloped beyond the traditional field covered by anti-discrimination law. 
The analytical framework is no longer focused on enhancing recognition 
for specific disadvantage inflicted on women of colour through systemic 
discrimination. Instead, intersectionality is seen as promoting “more flexi-
ble and open-ended categories in anti-discrimination law” (Sheppard 2015: 
256). Thus, intersectional discrimination could be deemed to exist if wom-
 
27 The resulting changes are well-documented; see for example Schraad-Tischler 2016; 
Vlad & Tache 2013. 
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en of lower socio-economic status are specifically affected by a certain 
governmental policy.  
In Europe, such strategies to use intersectionality abound. For example, 
in France, equality activists, when discussing gender quotas, promoted us-
ing the intersection of class and gender (but not religion, race, and gender) 
as a category to assess their adequacy at addressing relevant social prob-
lems (Lépinard 2013). Similarly, class and gender are being introduced as 
additional categories to be considered in anti-racist policies (Tiberj & Mi-
chon 2013). Further studies of anti-crisis measures addressing the gendered 
character of youth unemployment purport to address the intersection of un-
employment and gender (Colombo & Rebughini 2015).  
Does this trend render irrelevant any refocusing on the purpose of anti-
discrimination law? Would a node-focused intersectionality analysis have 
any advantage over the wider one, focusing on class or poverty instead?   
6. Anti-crisis measures and discrimination law  
Legal challenges to anti-crisis measures in the EU can be approached as 
a fictional laboratory in order to answer this question. The laboratory is fic-
tional, because human rights challenges to anti-crisis measures have to rely 
on the existing legislation. Accordingly, they cannot rely on any prohibition 
of class discrimination if using EU anti-discrimination law, though they can 
use origin or wealth if contained in national human rights instruments. 
However, would the addition of class as a discrimination ground improve 
the quality of the challenge? 
As long as austerity measures are challenged using anti-discrimination 
law (Kilpatrick 2014), these challenges may, for example, use the extent to 
which austerity measures increase female poverty (Lahey & Villota 2013). 
Such challenges can have a dual motive; on the one hand, the justiciability 
of anti-discrimination sections of human rights catalogues may enable liti-
gants to expose the wider injustices inflicted by austerity measures. This 
would be an instrumental use of gender equality law. Similarly, instrumen-
tal uses of UN human rights conventions (Fredman & Goldblatt 2015) 
might be motivated by the desire to achieve specific reports requiring gov-
ernments to change austerity measures, adding weight to the political cri-
tique of those. Gender-related challenges of austerity measures might also 
be motivated by a desire to expose the specific injustices inflicted by ignor-
ing gendered inequality. Accordingly, the challenge of austerity measures 
might also be aimed at changing the specific measure, in order to distribute 
the consequences of austerity more equally between women and men. If so 
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motivated, the critique can even address the situation of differently posi-
tioned women, and consider whether, for example, ethnic minority women, 
or disabled women are more severely affected than white or able-bodied 
women. This would constitute a veritable intersectionality analysis of aus-
terity measures (Goldblatt 2015).  
Such a discrimination law analysis would expose discriminatory ele-
ments of social state retrenchment. We use the term ‘social state’ deliber-
ately here, instead of the more commonly used term ‘welfare state’28. The 
latter term originates from the approach taken to “benefits” in the so-called 
liberal welfare states29. Under this approach, welfare is mainly restricted to 
the pay-out of strictly means tested benefits. In constitutional social states, 
by contrast, citizens not only have a constitutional claim to “benefits”, but 
are also included in social institutions which then constitute societies which 
are inclusive overall.  
If it is correct that women are poorer than men on average, or that those 
racialised because they are in an ethnic minority are excluded from em-
ployment opportunities, retrenching institutions that ensure inclusion, or 
reducing the general level of payments for those who are not able to earn 
sufficiently through work, will affect relatively more women, persons as-
cribed minority status, and even more severely impact on women ascribed 
ethnic minority status. Accordingly, with careful statistical work, the first 
step of an indirect discrimination challenge could be accomplished. Of 
course, the austerity measure could still be justified, if it pursues a valuable 
objective, such as enabling the relevant state to obtain funds it desperately 
needs. The justification would fail if there would be less-discriminatory al-
ternatives. For example, in states which also provide specific benefits for 
proportions of the population, in which women or ethnic minorities are not 
overrepresented, those benefits could be reduced instead of those for the 
poorest. In this way, austerity would have less discriminatory effects. While 
this may seem a perverse result at first hand, excluding additional discrimi-
natory effects of social state entrenchment is a worthwhile exercise if we 
accept that the state, just as market participants, should not reinforce sys-
temic discrimination. This critique, although more intellectually and analyt-
ically challenging, exposes more precisely the discriminatory effects of so-
cial state entrenchment, instead of just utilising anti-discrimination law to 
support general social policies.  
 
28 See for example Castles et al. 2010. 
29 On the notions of ‘welfare state’ see Esping-Andersen (1990; 1999). See also Arts & 
Gelissen 2010 and subsequent chapters in the same volume. 
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Now, what would be achieved if class, or living below the poverty line, 
were discrimination grounds? First, it would be easier to challenge austerity 
measures with discrimination law, as the difficulties of launching a discrim-
ination claim would be avoided. However, this advantage would only be 
gained if social class could be defined with sufficient precision for discrim-
ination law. Such precision might be achieved, for example, by reference to 
household income not exceeding the lowest quartile of the population. Such 
a definition would possibly have negative gender effects, because the lack 
of command over income within households would be ignored. However, 
challenges would be easier than if applying a precise notion of anti-
discrimination law.  
This fictional assessment exposes that the gains of including class in an-
ti-discrimination law are, indeed, limited. If the aim is to attack state action, 
the constitutional and international human rights instruments already ban 
states from differentiation on the basis of income. Thus, these challenges 
could be raised at present, without diluting anti-discrimination law.  
If the aim is to provide an analytical framework of assessing the specific 
exclusion of, for example, poor women, this aim is also achieved by apply-
ing sex discrimination law to social state entrenchment. Social state en-
trenchment will hardly affect rich women. However, in many states it will 
affect ethnic minority women more severely than white women. This con-
clusion could be achieved by applying an intersectionality analysis on the 
basis of existing anti-discrimination law.  
The advantage of the more challenging standards would be a more tar-
geted critique of social state entrenchment, which links with the critique of 
supposedly gender-blind social states in better years. Just as, for example, 
the Beveridge model is partly less exclusive of women, in offering access 
to services such as health care irrespective of being over a threshold in la-
bour market inclusion or through family links, social state entrenchment 
exercised mindful of women’s specific situation will be less discriminatory. 
Discrimination argumentation cannot be diluted into a mere social policy 
argument, while a precise application of its categories is still required.  
The fictional experiment thus demonstrates that enriching anti-
discrimination legislation by class as a discrimination ground has limited 
advantages for legal intersectionality analysis. Most likely the disad-
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7. Conclusion  
In order to make anti-discrimination law more suitable for addressing in-
tersectional inequalities, it is necessary to avoid overstretch30, and to refo-
cus anti-discrimination law. This refocusing should avoid including class or 
poverty as categories used by positive EU discrimination law. Such an ex-
pansion of “discrimination grounds” would result in the loss of focus of an-
ti-discrimination law on a specific wrong. This wrong consists of social 
disadvantage through market based discrimination triggered by ascribed 
otherness. Wider aims of social justice, such as overcoming poverty and 
social exclusion altogether, cannot be achieved by anti-discrimination law. 
Anti-discrimination law remains a suitable and necessary instrument for 
addressing any discriminatory bias within policies and law attempting to 
overcome poverty and exclusion. This even holds true if austerity measures 
are used to legitimise further re-entrenchment of social state law.  
Accordingly, the categories developed for sociological analyses of ine-
qualities at the intersections are wholly unsuitable for legal analyses of in-
tersectionality. For legal analysis, the mission of anti-discrimination law is 
decisive. This mission requires maintaining focus on the specific aims of 
combating exclusion on the basis of ascribed personality traits beyond mar-
ket-related categories. Maintaining this focus is a precondition for main-
taining anti-discrimination law’s application to market-based exchange and 
the public sector alike. In societies increasingly determined by market ex-
change, this focus also maintains the relevance of anti-discrimination law 
for social reality.  
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